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Abstract
If my statement about the first Yugoslavia being in many ways a non-synchronized and con-
tradictory state is correct, what then can be said about the second Yugoslavia that endeavored, by
keeping silent, to fill in the fatal fissure opened in Jasenovac and other places of annihilation of
Serbs in the so-called Independent State of Croatia during the Second World War? For that reason,
the former intermediator of the “international community” in Yugoslav conflicts, Lord Carrington,
has repeatedly stated that with its new Constitution, Croatia rekindled the conflict with the Serbs.
RECONCILIATION: APPLYING HISTORICAL
LESSONS TO MODERN CONFLICTS
Lord David Owen*
All wars are terrible, but civil wars are the most terrible, as
the people of the British Isles can still attest three and a half
centuries on. This year we look back fifty years at the end of the
Second World War. We, who lived through that War, are all
scarred by it; but to a lesser or greater extent. Unlike the First
World War, where it was what happened in the trenches and on
the battlefield that has left its mark on history, the Second World
War is fated to be remembered not just for famous battles but
also for what was done off the battlefield to the Jews in the Nazi
concentration camps and to the Allied servicemen in the Japa-
nese work camps.
For those in the United Kingdom who fought during that
War there are still deep abiding memories, horrors, war wounds,
lost friends, and comrades. For those who worked in factories or
on the land there are vivid memories too, fear, comradeship,
austerity, absent loved ones, rationing, and blackouts. For the
young, like myself, the memories are no less vivid: tension at
home, no father around, mother working, nights in shelters or
under the stairs, no luxuries, sweets, or bananas. We all, in our
various ways, and in different countries, have had to reconcile
the past with the present and with the future.
It is an individual decision whether to forgive, to forget, or
what blend of each suits his or her temperament. Remembering
and forgetting are part of reconciling. Reconciliation is easier
for those who do not lose a war and harder for those who may
not have lost but who had the humiliation of being occupied.
We all choose our own individual pattern, there is no right or
wrong way, no general rule of how to think or act. It depends on
one's own circumstances, one's own nature. The state cannot
and should not attempt to abrogate to itself the task of being the
reconciler for its citizens. I am not even convinced that it can
give more than a lead in what is a process of reconciliation that
has to go far wider and deeper than governments.
Reconciliation is a noble theme, one to which much
* Former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom.
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thought has been given and to which much experience has been
gained over the centuries. There is a role in the process of rec-
onciliation for monarchs, presidents, and governments, but
above all it is the citizens who set the pace of reconciliation and
determine its quality. If government listens only to the loud
voices, they may miss the quiet wisdom of those who consider
vengeance as a mechanism for sowing the seeds of future vio-
lence and more wars.
The aftermath of our Civil War was dealt with in the two
Restoration Settlements which covered the legislation of 1660-
62. In the Declaration of Breda 355 years ago, Charles II ad-
dressed all his subjects:
If the general distraction and confusion which is spread over
the whole Kingdom doth not awaken all men to a desire and
longing that those wounds which have so many years together
been kept bleeding may be bound up, all we can say will be to
no purpose. However, after this long silence we have thought
it our duty to declare how much we desire to contribute
thereunto... we do grant a free and general pardon which
we are ready upon demand to pass under our Great Seal of
England, to all our subjects.
The Act of Indemnity and Oblivion which followed "halted
all process of revenge or retribution."' Only those who signed
Charles I's death warrant or had been involved in his execution,
those responsible for the Irish Rebellion of 1641, and a few "ob-
noxious individuals," were exempted from its very full and ample
provisions.
Unfortunately, Charles II's undertaking on religious free-
dom in the Declaration of Breda was never enacted and instead
a reactionary church settlement ensued. Was the Restoration a
reconciliation? Did the Royalist cause win? Did the Parliamen-
tarians retain some things of real value? Historians differ, but
the mere fact that such questions are still being asked perhaps
indicates "that in politics there are no absolute victors in the
long term and that national life is ultimately the product of all
who set their hand to it."2
During the American Civil War, sensing Southern disaffec-
1. THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603-1688, at 336 (J.P. Kenyon ed., 2d ed. 1986).
2. RONALD HurrON, THE RESTORATION: A POLITICAL AND RELIGIOuS HISTORY OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 1658-1667, at 182 (1985).
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tion,3 President Abraham Lincoln on December 8, 1863, offered
pardon and amnesty to all persons who took an oath of alle-
giance to the United States and to all its laws and proclamations
concerning slavery, exempting only Confederate Government
officials and high ranking officers. Whenever ten percent of the
people in any state had taken the oath, the loyalists could form a
recognized state government. To Lincoln, secession was illegal
and the Southern states remained in the Union.
In Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address on March 4, 1865,
he said, "with malice toward none; with charity for all; with firm-
ness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on
to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds."
Following the defeat of the South and the assassination of Presi-
dent Lincoln, the United States entered into the Age of Recon-
struction. It was a complex period and like our Restoration, his-
torians argue over the outcome. One historian4 perceptively
highlights the failure of politicians, as opposed to "businessmen,
railway entrepreneurs, tourists, novelists, journalists," in achiev-
ing reconstruction and reconciliation and judging the war today,
in terms of the interests of the American Union, concludes:
Nothing is here for tears, nothing to wail
Or knock the breast; no weakness, no contempt,
Dispraise or blame.5
Another historian6 writes, "Reconstruction then failed to
save the South from herself, and the Afro-American from the
South" and concludes "for Americans, a sour taste of failure and
disappointment will always hang about the epoch."7
In the last fifteen years in Africa we have seen three spectac-
ular reconciliations in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa
which give immense hope. They also remind us of some other
major achievements of the decolonialization period, whether in
India, the largest democracy in the world, or in Kenya after the
"MauMau." In 1977-79, as Foreign Secretary, while striving for a
peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, during many hours of negotia-
3. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIIL WAR ERA 698 (1988).
4. ALAN BARKER, THE CIVL WAR IN AMERICA 165-66, 169 (1961).
5. Id.
6. HUGH BROGAN, THE LONGMAN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 383-
84 (1985).
7. Id.
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tions and private discussions, I and others were never able to
persuade the leader of ZANU, Robert Mugabe, to accept during
the war the need for a general amnesty afterwards. It was a sur-
prise and a delight, therefore, when after ZANU-PFs won fifty-
seven seats and thereby secured an overall majority in the elec-
tions held on February 14, 1980, that on being invited to form
the Government, Mr. Mugabe emphasized in a broadcast, on
March 4, that the need for unity and reconciliation would be
reflected in his government. He said he would include Mr.
Nkomo's party and consider white representation in his Cabinet,
"so as to bring about a government that will be reassuring to all
people of Zimbabwe." He then, amazingly, retained General
Walls,9 who had fought the Patriotic Front on behalf of Mr.
Smith's illegal government, 10 to preside over the formation of an
integrated national army. On March 20, an amnesty order be-
came law covering all politically motivated offenses in the period
up to March 1, 1980. Military reconciliation of the different
armed forces was the key achievement of Prime Minister
Mugabe's first 100 days in office, for there were heinous crimes
to forget, massacres on all sides, and the infamous actions of the
Smith Government Selous Scouts, who specialized in provoking
and laying the blame on others for their actions.
In Namibia, U.N. supervised elections from November 7 to
November 11, 1989, gave the South West Africa People's Organi-
zation" ("SWAPO") an overall majority of seats but they did not
obtain the two-thirds majority that would have enabled them
alone to have drawn up the constitution for an independent
Namibia. Sam Nujoma, seen by many whites as a communist,
8. Rhodesia: Official Election Results by Districts, BBC Summary World Broadcasts,
Mar. 6, 1980, pt. 4, at BI, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ARCNWS File (tran-
scribing broadcast by Rhodesia's Registrar-General Eric Pope-Simmonds describing
election victory by the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, ZANU-PF).
9. General Walls' 13th March News Conference in Johannesburg, BBC Summary World
Broadcasts, Mar. 15, 1979, pt. 4, at B4, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ARCNWS
File (describing, in interview with General Walls, raids into neighboring territories
against opposition forces).
10. Bruce Bartlett, Sanctions Almost Never Work, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1985, at 14
(describing failure of U.N.-backed sanctions to affect Ian Smith's illegal control of Rho-
desia from 1965 to 1979).
11. Mark Verbaan, Namibia: Constituent Assembly Sits for Inaugural Session, Inter
Press Service, Nov. 21, 1989, available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, ARCNWS File. In
U.N.-supervised elections, SWAPO won 57% of the vote, and 41 seats of the 72 member
assembly. Id.
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who had fought for liberation from outside the country, said on
November 15, that SWAPO was looking forward to the coopera-
tion of other parties and had "no intention of imposing our
views on others" and thereby set the tone for a successful transi-
tion and reconciliation between white and black. This helped
lay foundations for what was to come in South Africa.
In Cape Town on Sunday, February 11, 1990, Nelson
Mandela, after his release from prison, made his first public
speech in twenty-five years. He disappointed some by addressing
his own supporters first, "I am a loyal and disciplined member of
the African National Congress. I am therefore in full agreement
with all of its objectives, strategies, and tactics. The need to
unite the people of our country is as important a task now as it
has always been."12 Yet in retrospect, most would agree that Mr.
Mandela was correct at that stage, some time before Prime Min-
ister de Klerk himself could publicly accept one person, one
vote, to stress the discipline needed for political victory. By do-
ing so, Mr. Mandela placed himself in a position where he could
call for self-discipline on the path towards reconciliation, forge
the agreement to form a Government of National Unity, and
then display incredible magnanimity after winning the election
in 1994. South African racial reconciliation sent a powerful
message out across the world to every racist malpractice in it.
This was the stupendous achievement of President Mandela in
his first 100 days in office.
It has been commented on by many people who know Af-
rica that there are lessons we Europeans can learn from their
capacity to reconcile, and maybe history will give an important
role for this to the churches and missionaries who have not won
many accolades so far in the history of decolonialization. After
the genocide in Rwanda it will be interesting to see whether rec-
onciliation can be achieved between the Hutu and Tutsi peo-
ples. The U.N. Security Council decided to establish a Rwanda
War Crimes Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, after it became clear
from documents that the genocide was conceived, planned, and
executed well in advance. The Special Rapporteur appointed by
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, in a report on 28 June,
12. Nelson Mandela Freed in South Africa; Leaves Jail after 27 Years, FACTS ON FILE
WoRLD NEws DIGEST, Feb. 16, 1990, at 98.
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1994,13 said the killing had been planned and "systematic" and
constituted a genocide, an opinion confirmed by others. Geno-
cide is a crime against the whole of humanity. The U.N. Con-
vention on Genocide defines a genocide as "acts committed with
intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial,
or religious group." 4 It is a highly specific crime to eliminate a
definable group from this planet - to kill someone deliberately
because a person is a Jew or a Tutsi. It is estimated that more
than half a million Tutsis were killed over a ten-week period, half
of Rwanda's Tutsi population.
In Europe we are still grappling with the process of reconcil-
iation in the aftermath of the Nazi's genocide of approximately
eleven million Jews. Perhaps, because of Europe's sophisticated,
well-developed legal system, reconciliation has tended to be set
within a legal framework. Justice, not vengeance, was the cry
around which a broad measure of agreement was reached in
dealing with Nazi crimes. A tradition exists in continental Eu-
rope of a statute of limitation for murder or being an accessory
to murder, though no such limitation applies in Britain, the
United States, or Canada. This tradition meant that in Germany
and in Austria, a limitation on all Nazi crimes seemed natural to
some and was due to expire in 1965. After much international
protest,15 the Austrian Government decided to abolish the limi-
tation on the prosection of murder, and Germany resolved to
extend the terms until 1979. In 1968, the General Assembly of
the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Non-Appli-
cability of Statutory Limitations on War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity, 6 which requires parties to eliminate statutory
or other limitations, but only thirty countries have become party
to the Convention. On July 3, 1979, by a majority of 255 against
222, the German Bundestag decided to rescind the statute of
limitation for murder and accessory to murder. These decisions
represented an important recognition that Nazi genocide was of
a wholly different dimension and it revitalized a concept ofjus-
13. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994).
14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. 11, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 4421), at 4.
15. SIMON WIESENTHAL, JUSTICE NOT VENGEANCE 160-63 (1989).
16. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Dec. 16, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68.
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tice best summed up by Robert Kennedy:1 7 "Moral duties have
no term."
In the United Kingdom, we have recently had an important
debate over the concept of whether justice, not in a spirit of re-
venge or retribution, must always live on. The House of Com-
mons had to decide whether to introduce a War Crimes Bill. In
a Free Vote, I and some others voted against the Bill, but a ma-
jority voted in its favor. Personally, I had been strongly influ-
enced by a letter in the Times on July 29, 1989, by the former
Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, now
Lord Shawcross, who said:
I cannot believe that a revival of all these sad and terrible
matters by sensational trials of a small handful of aged men,
which will take years to conduct and which will start with an
assumption of guilt, will help to promote understanding and
friendship between the different peoples of the world, will
help to eliminate the evil of anti-Semitism or - still less -
enhance the respect for British Justice. a"
I also remembered the words of Sir Winston Churchill
when, in a speech in Zurich on September 19, 1946, he said,
"there must be an end to retribution. We must turn our backs
upon the horrors of the past, and we must look to the future."
In the House of Lords on June 4, 1990, the Lords declined
to give the Bill a second reading. Nevertheless, it was enacted by
the Commons in the next session of Parliament under the proce-
dure of the Parliament Acts whereby the Commons can rightly
assert its democratic legitimacy over the non-elected Lords. In
this case, the House of Commons chose to reopen the decision
taken in July 1948, by the then Labour Government, not to pur-
sue war crime investigations and trials on people in the British
occupied zone and enable the courts in this country to try of-
fenses of murder and manslaughter committed as war crimes in
Germany or German occupied territory during the period of the
Second World War. That 1948 decision was based on the belief
that it would further the goal of reconciliation. Today, we can
fairly claim that with Austria and the now reunited Federal Re-
public of Germany as members of the European Union, we have
achieved a degree of reconciliation perhaps unparalleled in his-
17. WIESENTHAL, supra note 15, at 158.
18. Letter to the Editor, LONDON TIMEs, July 29, 1989, at 11.
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tory. We have much to be grateful for the wisdom of those who
did not repeat the victors' mistakes after the end of the First
World War.
The dilemma of reconciliation is that if justice is to be an
absolute, then there can be no pardons or amnesties. Yet, over
many centuries, different countries have determined that the
need for justice should be capable of being overridden by the
need for reconciliation. Some argue that the need for reconcili-
ation to override justice particularly applies in civil wars. But it is
not always easy to make a clear-cut distinction between wars of
aggression and civil war. This is very much the case in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, where there have, since 1991, been at least four
distinct wars.
Countries have normally tried to uphold justice as an abso-
lute in the prosecution of crimes against humanity, particularly
genocide. I do believe that the Nuremberg Trials had, and still
have, lasting value. It contributed to reconciliation that many of
those most responsible for the Holocaust were brought to jus-
tice. It was a mistake that the U.N. Charter did not provide for
the establishment of an International Criminal Court. At its
third session, the General Assembly in 1948 asked the Interna-
tional Law Commission19 ("ILC"), one of its expert organs, to
study the establishment of an international judicial organ for the
trial of persons charged with genocide or other international
crimes. After considering the consequent report of the ILC, the
General Assembly in 1950 and in 1952 established ad hoc com-
mittees of seventeen states, which both drew up draft statutes for
an international criminal court ("ICC"). The General Assembly,
however, decided to set aside this project in 1954, ostensibly to
await the adoption of a definition of aggression; even when that
was accomplished in 1974, however, the General Assembly de-
cided not to take up the question of an ICC. In 1989, Trinidad
and Tobago proposed that an ICC be set up, initially just to deal
with international drug crimes; the General Assembly again as-
signed this question to the ILC, which started to study it with
increasing urgency after the Gulf War-and especially in 1993 af-
ter the Security Council established the Yugoslav War Crimes
19. G.A. Res. 174, U.N. Doc. A/RES/174(II) (1947) (establishing International
Law Commission); GA. Res. 36/39, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/39
(1981) (expanding International Law Commission to include 34 members).
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Tribunal.2' The ILC reported a preliminary draft of the statute
of an ICC in that year, and presented a perfected draft in 1994.
The General Assembly then established an ad hoc committee,
open to all member states, to meet initially from April 3 to April
13, 1995, to review the ILC draft, with the view to convening a
diplomatic conference to conclude a convention to establish an
ICC. How quickly this will happen and how popular the whole
idea will be remains to be seen.
It is generally agreed that a General Assembly-sponsored
treaty is the only feasible way to establish a permanent interna-
tional criminal court, as the Security Council would have no au-
thority to establish a standing organ to cover international
crimes, such as airplane hijacking, hostage-taking, and attacks
against diplomats. One legally satisfactory alternative would be
to establish the criminal court through a Charter amendment,
which, once it entered into force, would bind all Member States.
Charter amendments, however, are difficult to achieve.
In 1992, on the invitation of the London Conference on the
former Yugoslavia, it fell to Cyrus Vance and myself to recom-
mend how the international community should deal with people
who have allegedly committed war crimes in the various wars
that had engulfed the former Yugoslavia since 1991. Predomi-
nantly crimes by Serbs against Muslims, but also against Croats,
and Croats against Serbs and Muslims, and Muslims against
Croats and Serbs. While conscious as negotiators of the value of
pardons and amnesties, we felt the nature of these crimes de-
manded the establishment of a Court or Tribunal. We would
have preferred to establish, under the U.N. Charter, an Interna-
tional Court, to which cases could be referred from any part of
the world, and we informed the Foreign Ministers of this in De-
cember 1992, when they attended the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia ("ICFY") meeting in Geneva. Sadly,
we later concluded that there was not sufficient support within
the Security Council for such a Court. We therefore recom-
mended establishing an ad hoc court specifically to try crimes
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. We be-
lieved it essential that any Court or Tribunal should be free
standing, independent, not connected in any way with the ICFY,
20. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
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and consciously divorced from the peacemaking or peacekeep-
ing process.
We recommended that the ad hoc court be established
under the authority of Chapter VII of the Security Council be-
cause it would be faster than enacting a treaty that would have to
be ratified by every country. We felt that the Court or Tribunal
would be able to draw on the enforcement power of the Security
Council to bring people to justice and comply with a warrant of
arrest, in effect to extradite. Any political judgments as to the
duration of the Court or Tribunal's jurisdiction would be taken
by the Security Council. In this way we hoped the issue would
not be subject to bargaining between the leaders of the coun-
tries involved in the war, some of whose leaders might them-
selves be brought to trial. We deliberately chose the Security
Council, in effect the World's Parliament, because it, unlike the
General Assembly, can pass binding international "legislation" if
it is faced with a threat to the peace. Nothing that has happened
since has made me wish to change our recommendations. I am
glad the Security Council established the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("Tribunal"). The Tribunal's
statute gives it the power to prosecute persons accused of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,21 violations of the
laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
Security Resolution 827,2 which established the Tribunal, saw it
as being able "to contribute to the restoration and maintenance
of peace." To do this, the Tribunal must help to deter future
crimes and its deterrent function cannot be divorced from pro-
viding punishment and retribution.
The Security Council will be able to resolve the dilemma
over reconciliation and whether justice in this particular part of
the world at some future moment in time should or should not
remain an absolute. I cannot conceive of the Security Council
terminating the activity merely because of a peace settlement. It
is now bound to proceed to the trial and sentencing stage. Nor
should it give up just because some of the suspects are not
21. Geneva Conventions For The Protection of War Victims Concerning: I Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, II
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, III Treatment of Prisoners of War, IV Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
22. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 20.
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forced to leave their country and stand trial. Governments
change, public opinion changes, "pariah status," not being able
to travel, are in themselves deterrents.
For those already issues with arrest warrents, like Radovan
Karad~i or General Ratko Mladic, I do not believe that it would
be right to grant any request for an amnesty or pardon. A key
role that the Tribunal will have relates to "ethnic cleansing;" how
it will be defined and classified. Some fear that any settlement
that does not reverse all the ethnic cleansing that has taken
place will in some ill-defined way ratify ethnic cleansing. I see no
way in which this would happen. Within the ICFY, all draft
peace settlements and countless bilateral and trilateral state-
ments signed by the parties have included a condemnation of
ethnic cleansing and a declaration that any documentation
signed under duress is null and void. It will be very important
for the future of international humanitarian law to have this
whole issue of ethnic cleansing clarified and to have it made
clear that it is a crime for which its perpetrators can be charged
and punished. In the former Yugoslavia the Serbian nation is
not on trial, but individuals whether Serb, Croat, or Muslim,
must be held responsible, whether prominent or local decision
makers, and, as happened over the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals, justice should proceed, individuals should be investi-
gated, brought to trial, and if need be, extradition procedures
enforced by the Security Council, suspects judged and, if found
guilty, sentenced.
I believe that demonstrating to the world again that there
are international laws governing individual conduct during war
will contribute to the process of reconciliation in the former Yu-
goslavia and send a wider message to the world as a whole. I
believe it was necessary to deal with genocide and crimes in
Rwanda, but I regret that the Security Council still felt it neces-
sary to establish a Rwanda-specific court rather than establish an
international court of universal application. But, I hope that the
experience gained from dealing with the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda will provide the basis for an early U.N. decision to set up
a permanent International Court for trying people suspected of
war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity, and I
believe that such a decision would have the effect of making it
less likely that such crimes will be committed in the future.
I have pondered long and hard some of the other ways in
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which reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia can be promoted.
Some have suggested a Truth Commission, not to prosecute but
to learn. Truth is in short supply in the former Yugoslavia, for
the lies go back to the Second World War. It was not only then a
fight between Partisans and Fascists, but also a civil war with
many people killed by their own kind. To establish the truth
about the wars that raged from 1991 onwards in the former Yu-
goslavia would be well worthwhile, but I do not believe it will be
possible to do, and even the exercise would be wasted effort giv-
ing grounds for more recrimination than reconciliation.
Eventually it may be possible to promote reconciliation in
the former Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, by trying to ensure that all
have the same broad historical perspective. Historians will often
differ in their interpretations of facts, but it would help if history
books at least showed some common ground on basic facts. This
was one of the early tasks taken up by UNESCO2 but with very
variable results. One of the most potent factors in the violent
break-up of the former Yugoslavia was the recrudescence of its
history. Tito's propaganda had obscured the reality of the civil
war that raged from 1941-45. When Belgrade and Zagreb TV in
1991 revived the term Ustasha for the Croats and Chetniks for
the Serbs, the old hatreds came back even for the young.
It is, I am told, since I do not read Japanese, a sad feature of
our much slower reconciliation with Japan than Germany that
the history books in Japanese schools still describe the events
leading up to, during, and immediately after the Second World
War, in very different terms from those of the history books in
Europe and in the United States. It cannot be beyond the capac-
ity of all our governments, who work together in the OECD24
and the United Nations, to try and reconcile the facts. As a con-
tribution to that wider reconciliation, it would be good if the G8
Summit took an initiative to reconcile the history books of the
eight participating nations.
I was very impressed by the wisdom shown by the Polish
Government, in contrast to that of the U.K. Government, in in-
viting all the countries of the former Yugoslavia to the 50th Anni-
versary of the ending of the horror of the Auschwitz concentra-
tion camp. No doubt some in the Polish Government were
23. U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
24. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
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tempted not to ask the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) which Poland, like most other members of the
United Nations, had not formally recognized. But to do this
would have been to visit the sins of the sons on their fathers.
Poland, who, after the Soviet Union, suffered the most casualties
of the Allied forces, must have been conscious that the Yugos-
lavs, mostly Serbs, suffered the third most casualties in that war,
and that in the Nazi and Croatian Ustasha concentration camps
there was a massive genocide committed against the Serbs.
The British Government was right, I believe, to listen to the
views of ex-servicemen who fought in Southeast Asia who did not
wish to abandon the term VJ Day that we have used for fifty
years. But their voice, however loud, cannot always be the deter-
mining factor. His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, who
fought in the Pacific during that war, showed courage and won
respect for being ready to represent the Queen at the funeral of
Emperor Hiohito. The ex-servicemen in the West country who
criticized the decision that Toshiba should build factories in
Plymouth, my home town, fifteen years ago were listened to with
respect but did not carry the day, and now there is hardly a per-
son who regrets that decision, and the Japanese management
are welcomed and appreciated. It is as people learn more about
each other's countries and cultures that reconciliation puts
down its roots. My children know a modern democratic Ger-
many and Japan within which they have travelled and lived with
ease and enjoyment. My generation forgives Germany and Ja-
pan but does not forget. My father, who recently died, served as
a doctor in the Royal Army Medical Corp in France, North Af-
rica, and Italy. He was the mildest of men but he neither forgot
nor forgave Germany nor the Japanese for what that war did to
him and his generation.
Such is the reconciliation process. The sins of the fathers
must not be visited on their sons, least of all on their grandsons.
Of one thing we can be certain. There will never be, as long as
the European Union remains in being to bind us together, an-
other war pitting Germany and Austria against the United King-
dom and France.
